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CASE COMMENTS
Cincinnati v. Hoffman:
A Critical Analysis of the Constitutionality
of a Municipal Disorderly Conduct OrdinanceM ICHELE BROWN, JEFFREY BERLINER, AND DAVID HOFFMAN attended
an anti-war demonstration in downtown Cincinnati on March 7,
1970. The demonstration proceeded without incident and was conclud-
ing as some of the participants moved to other downtown areas. The
facts, as apparently found by the jury, were that an alleged incident
involving the desecration of the American flag caused a melee to
break out between police and demonstrators. Miss Brown, age nine-
teen, was closest to the center of the disturbance and reportedly
addressed noisy and abusive language to police officers who then
attempted to arrest her. Berliner, age twenty-one, rushed, shouting,
to her assistance and joined the struggle between Miss Brown and
police. Hoffman, age twenty-six, a newspaper reporter, is supposed
to then have included himself in the disturbance, shouting "The
press is watching" and "Arrest me, too." Miss Brown was found
guilty of disorderly conduct1 and sentenced to 30 days incarceration,
$100 fine and costs. Berliner and Hoffman were found guilty of inter-
fering with a police officer.2 Hoffman was sentenced to six months'
incarceration, $1000 fine and costs. Berliner received a one year's
sentence, a $2500 fine, and costs. On appeal all three convictions were
affirmed by the Hamilton County Court of Appeals.3 All three were
again affirmed by the Ohio State Supreme Court.
The first question answered by the Court, relating to Miss
Brown's conviction was: Is the Cincinnati ordinance as written and
as applied void as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad? The ma-
jority answered in the negative, relying heavily on Cotten v. Ken-
tucky4 and Coates v. Cincinnati.' These two cases were distinguished
I Section 901-d4 of the CoDe Of ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF CINCINNATI reads;
It shall be unlawful for any person to willfully conduct himself or herself in
a noisy, boisterous, rude, insulting or other disorderly manner, with the intent
to abuse or annoy any person or the citizens of the City or any portion thereof.
2 Section 901-r2 of the CODE OF ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF CINCINNATI reads:
No person shall resist, hinder, obstruct, or abuse any police officer while
such officer is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties. Whoever violates
this provision shall be imprisoned in the Workhouse for a period of not more
than one (1) year, or fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) or
both.
3 There were originally four defendants in this case. On appeal the charge against one Joyce
Reichman (also disorderly conduct) was reversed. The other three convictions were af-
firmed on April 19, 1971, without opinion.
4 92 SCr. 1953 (1972). The Court in this case upheld a law dealing with interfering with
officers of the state while they were engaged in the exercise of their duties. The court inter-
preted "knowingly" as sufficient to mean wrongful purpose and thereby excluded any pur-
pose to exercise constitutional rights.
5 402 U.S. 611 (1971). An ordinance against loitering was involved in this case, which
contained the word "'annoying." The Supreme Court upheld a charge of vagueness, stating
"Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others." Id., at 614.
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from the Hoffman case in that the proscribed annoying or unlawful
conduct was required to be based on a constitutional standard of
scienter and mew rea to save the statutes and ordinances in ques-
tion from judicial invalidation.
The second question, relating to the convictions of Hoffman and
Berliner, was: May a municipal ordinance in conflict with a state
statute covering the same area be judicially rehabilitated by a
charge to the jury so as not to violate constitutional due process
requirements of specificity and clarity? The Court's answer was
affirmative.
The decision is supported on the issue of vagueness by City of
Cleveland v. Anderson,' where an almost identical ordinance was
considered. Because the court chose to focus on a different element
in this ordinance, mere passive attendance at a disorderly incident,
the implication may be drawn that the ordinance would be sound
otherwise. Statutory vagueness has, on many occasions, been defined
by the Supreme Court of the United States as:
.. [a] statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.8
In a short paragraph, the majority of the Ohio Supreme Court
draws the conclusion that, since it has determined the ordinance not
vague, then, if reasonably construed, the ordinance could not be
overbroad.9 The weakness of the decision lies in this reasoning, for
although it has been noted that the two doctrines are frequently not
differentiated, and in fact are usually inseparable, they are not, in
every instance, corollaries.'0
The twin doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth are almost
unique in the area of the "preferred" constitutional rights dealing
6 Section 2917.33 of the OIo REVISED CODE reads:
No person shall abuse a judge or justice of the peace in the execution of
his office, or knowingly and willfully resist, obstruct, or abuse a sheriff, or other
officer in the execution of his office. Whoever violates this section shall be fined
not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisoned not more than thirty
(30) days, or both.
1 13 Ohio App,2d 83, 234 N.E.2d 304 (1968). The ordinance in this case made it un-
lawful for any person to willfully and knowingly engage in noisy, boisterous, or disorderly
assemblage of persons, or to countenance the sdme by his presence, to the annoyance of the
citizens of Cleveland (emphasis added).
0 Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
1 Cincinnati v. Hoffman, 31 Ohio St.2d 163, 285 N.E.2d 714, 718 (1972).
10 Note, The First Amendment Overbreadtb Doctrine, 83 -ARV. L. REV. 844 (1970); Note,
The Void For-Vagavnes Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
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with the expression of ideas." The keen judicial interest in careful
scrutiny of statutes in this sensitive area is based on the courts'
need to rely on the legislative judgment of responsible policy-making
bodies rather than on the ad hoc determinations of lesser delegated
officers of the states.
Undeniably, a statute or ordinance, read with imagination, can
be applied at least beyond the scope of the legislative intent, and
at most, unconstitutionally. 2 If every contested statute were ruled
void because it could conceivably infringe upon some protected right,
the legislatures would be left to draft statutes that covered only
whatever else was not constitutionally protected. 3 To insure that the
legislatures shoulder their responsibility of careful draftmanship, the
Supreme Court has, on a case by case basis, developed guidelines for
ruling on the vagueness and overbreadth of a statute.
The "chilling effect" doctrine,14 a major weapon in the over-
breadth area, has two applications. Primarily, and practically by
definition, if a statute is so overbroad as to sweep constitutionally
protected expression within its ambit, it must be invalidated.5 Sec-
ondly, if a statute, though not patently vague and overbroad on its
face, lends itself to such conjecture as to its meaning so as to be
obeyed in the negative (i.e., citizens afraid to exercise their rights
due to uncertainty as to sanctions), again it must be invalidated.6
The dissent draws an apt illustration of the danger of the over-
breadth of this statute when it surmises that a citizen giving a
political speech could be arrested under the Cincinnati ordinance for
engaging in "noisy, and boisterous conduct with the intent to annoy
and abuse" other citizens.
17
11 Note, The First Amendment Overbreadtb Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 852 (1970);
Comment, Wisconsin's Disorderly Conduct Statuste: Why It Should Be Changed, 1969
Wis. L. REv. 602, 609 (1969). See concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-97 (1949); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §214 (1956); 10
OHIO JUR.2d Constitntional Law, §458 (1954).
2 In almost every decision in this area the courts are quick to say that they are cognizant of
the difficulty in drafting any law that is fair and comprehensive. They are also as quick
to state that this is no excuse for sloppy draftsmanship. See Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927), and cases following its reasoning to Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969), which overruled Whitney. These cases involved, for the most part, criminal
syndicalism laws developed during the world war which laws were extended into peace-
time to control many types of political expression and association.
13 A gallant attempt at specificity was made in a Chicago ordinance quoted in full in Landry
v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. III. 1968). The court said that the ordinance still did
not properly cover the area of activity at which it was aimed.
" Firs: enunciated in Wieman v. Updegrafl, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952), and further defined
in Walker v. Biuuiugham, 388 U.S. 307, 344-45 (1967). See generally, Note, The
Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. R .. B08 (1969).
Is Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
'6 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). This application of the doctrine presents some
interesting questions on the basis of standing to sue, as it is in actuality the plaintiff ad-
vancing another's rights.
1 Cincinnati v. Hoffman, 31 Ohio St.2d 163, 176, 285 N.E.2d 714, 722-23 (1972).
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"Chilling effect" alone, however, is not always enough to strike
down a statute for overbreadth. The courts will avoid such legislative-
judicial confrontation unless absolutely necessary. 8 The second ma-
jor guideline developed was the scope of the overbreadth. The Court
has generally maintained that the impact of the unconstitutional
application must be projected to a substantial part of the population, 1'
and that it must in that application affect one of the preferred rights.
The majority opinion in Hoffman chose to ignore, and the dissent to
de-emphasize, the failure of the ordinance in this respect. In the
present climate of take-to-the-streets demonstration, the implications
of this decision for political protest are disquieting. 0
Finally, a court presented with a vague or overbroad statute looks
to the alternatives to invalidating the statute completely. Ordinances
have been limited in their scope by judicial interpretation, or the
unconstitutional clauses have been separately voided if this action
can be reconciled with any apparent legislative intent. The Cincin-
nati ordinance, not vague on its face, but overbroad, does not appear
to be a likely candidate for any of these measures.
As to the second question, i.e., alleged conflict between a city
ordinance and a state statute, it appears that the court has developed
a third new solution for the conflict in addition to the one defined in
the Sokol' case and enlarged in Cleveland v. Betts. 2 The new solu-
tion is not the development of a test to measure the magnitude of the
conflict, but implied extension of the powers of the municipalities
which would appear to completely evade the purpose of the four-
teenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and
article XVIII, section 3 of the Ohio Constitution."
18 It has been evident since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that courts
would have to battle every step of the way in this kind of confrontation. Some are more
timorous than others, e.g., "'. . .where there is no duty to speak on such issues ... there
is a duty not to speak ..." Poulous v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 414 (1953); see
also Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principals of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
19 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S- 88 (1940).
20 The dangers of selective enforcement of a vague statute to silence opinions in opposition
to those of the majority have been mentioned in Shutlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S
147 (1969); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
(1951); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 US- 147 (1939).
21 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923). The court stated in the syllabus of this decision:
In determining whether an ordinance is in "conflict" with general laws, the
test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids
and prohibits, and vice versa.
168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958). A city ordinance carrying a more serious
penalty than the crime under the state statute was invalidated as contributing to non-uni-
formity in the state laws. The court expressly rejected the Sokol rule as the only rule in
this type of case, and appears to have adopted a test of sufficient difference to lend con-
fusion to state-wide law enforcement. The court stated that policy differences between
statutes and ordinances would make a conflict and invalidate the ordinance.
2$ OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, §3:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of self-government
(Continued on next page)
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Prior to this decision, any ordinance in conflict with a state
statute as to substance or penalty was invalidated if the conflict was
found to be such as to lead to confusion and/or non-uniformity of
the law. Both federal and Ohio courts have used a technique of analy-
sis of a statute as written, which injects a curative charge which
verges on translation to bring the mere words of the statute into
constitutionally narrow limits. 4 The Hoffman court has gone beyond
this by actually adding words and meaning that are not in the statute.
The majority relies on State v. Ross25 and State v. Jacobellis2
for support of its curative charge, but fails, it appears, to state that
the judicial narrowing of which the court is taking notice in these
cases is of an element, already in the statutes which has been analyzed
in context with other elements also already in the statute. Further-
more, the technique has generally been used against a doubtful statute
because the courts are adamant that citizens be fully aware of the
nature of the crimes with which they are to be charged. If a person
is charged with "knowingly" committing some illegal act, he is on
notice that he must have had some degree of "knowledge" of his acts.
The only element the courts have attempted to extrapolate as legis-
lative intent is the degree of knowledge necessary.27 If, however, the
courts are allowed, at the jury charge level, to amend the laws by
adding prior knowledge elements, each prosecution under theoretically
the same law would be a unique prosecution.
Conclusion
The expansion and definition of rights under the first amend-
ment have seen most of their development during the twentieth
century. Landmark decisions by the Supreme Court have always
placed a heavy burden on the majority, represented by law enforce-
(Continued from preceding page)
and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other
similar regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; not
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
24 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General
of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Smith
v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In
these cases, involving obscenity laws, the Court struggled with the proper definition of
the word "ubscene"; and in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US. 557 (1969) with what "know-
ingly" possessing obscene materials meant,
25 12 Ohio St.2d 37, 231 N.E.2d 299 (1967).
"6 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962), revd on ether grounds, Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184 (1964). See also, State v. Saylor, 6 Ohio St.2d 139, 216 N.E.2d 622
(1966).
27 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
[Vol. 22:198
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1973
CINCINNATI V. HOFFMAN
ment agencies, to prove that its interests outweighed the individ-
ual's right to express his thoughts, whenever, wherever, and in the
manner he chooses. The unfettered exchange of thought is basic to
democracy as we know it. If the past forty years since Schenck v.
United States29 have been progress, the Hoffman decision is a step
backward.
Diane Williams Shelbyt
' Etfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949);
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146
N.E.2d 854 (1957); Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 49 N.E.2d 412 (1943).
29 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
t Law Review Editor; third year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law.
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